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1.3
The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias
Jules Holroyd and Joseph Sweetman
The term ‘implicit bias’ has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical
discourse. Our aim in this chapter is to scrutinize the phenomena that fall under
the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense to
capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes.
However, here we articulate some of the important functional differences
between phenomena identiﬁed as instances of implicit bias. We caution against
ignoring these differences, as it is likely they have considerable signiﬁcance—not
least for the sorts of normative recommendations being made concerning how to
mitigate the bad effects of implicit bias.
1 The Disparate Phenomena called ‘Implicit Bias’
Philosophical attention has galvanized around the notion of implicit bias in
recent years. Roughly, studies show that individuals harbour many implicit
associations between mental constructs, such as ‘salt’ and ‘pepper’, or ‘white’
and ‘good’. Sometimes associations concerning stigmatized social groups inﬂu-
ence a decision or action. An implicitly biased decision or action is one that
expresses or embodies implicit features of cognition, which distort or inﬂuence
that behaviour. For example, the implicit association between the race category
‘white’ and evaluative term ‘good’ can inﬂuence people to judge more positively a
CV with a white-sounding name on it than the same CV with a black-sounding
name (Dovidio and Gaertner, 2000). Philosophers have been particularly con-
cerned with those implicit processes that inﬂuence behaviour in undesirable and
often discriminatory ways. Some of the questions that philosophers have been
interested in are: what are the ethical implications of acknowledging the inﬂuence
of implicit bias on decision and action? What are the consequences for our
understanding of agency, responsibility, and how we ought to act? What is
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epistemologically problematic about the operation of implicit bias?What kinds of
material changes in the world are needed to address and mitigate the likely
operation of implicit bias? (See e.g. Kelly and Roedder, 2008; Machery,
Faucher, and Kelly, 2010; Holroyd, 2012; Gendler, 2011; Haslanger, 2008.)
What, exactly, is implicit bias? Understanding this is an important step in
sensibly addressing these other questions. Our concern is that broad character-
izations of implicit bias have led to misleading generalizations, and normative
recommendations that may either be counterproductive, or at least less useful
than they could be—so we will argue.
Let us start by observing some of the ways in which the term has been
characterized and used. In her inﬂuential paper ‘Implicit bias, stereotype threat
and women in philosophy’, Jennifer Saul characterizes implicit bias as
unconscious biases that affect the way we perceive, evaluate, or interact with people from
the groups that our biases ‘target’. (2013: 40)
This is a useful functional deﬁnition: implicit biases are whatever unconscious
processes inﬂuence our perceptions, judgements and actions—in this context, in
relation to social category members (women, blacks, gays, for example).1 How-
ever, there is some evidence that suggests that implicit biases are not always
‘unconscious’. It is contentious that the participants are unaware of the cognition
that is being implicitly measured in tasks such as the IAT (De Houwer, 2006;
Monteith and Voils, 1998). Work on the correction of implicit race bias specif-
ically suggests that some awareness of implicit bias is possible, if not likely
(Wegener and Petty, 1995). It would not be surprising, given the argument to
follow, if there were variations in awareness of different implicit associations. The
debate about awareness of implicit processes is interesting, but is not our focus
here. (For a discussion, see De Houwer, 2006; Fazio and Olson, 2003, Hann et al.,
2013; Holroyd, 2014; see also Gawronski, Hofmann, and Wilbur, 2006).
More importantly for the focus of this chapter, the functional deﬁnition we
have started with here leaves open the matter of precisely what processes
constitute implicit bias, and in particular whether we are dealing with a singular
entity or a range of psychological tendencies.
A further concern is that this usage seems to permit ambiguous use of the
notion of implicit bias: sometimes ‘implicit bias’ is used to refer to an output such
as a biased decision or judgement (for example: ‘[i]t seems very likely, then, that
philosophers will display implicit bias against women’; Saul, 2013: 43). It is also
1 Saul’s focus is principally on harmful implicit biases, but she notes that there are a range of
idiosyncratic and unproblematic biases.
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used in a way that appears to refer to a mental state or process. This can be seen in
remarks concerning people ‘hav[ing] implicit biases’ (Saul, 2013: 55). We think
this encourages the tendency to suppose that there is a uniﬁed process or state
(‘implicit bias’) that produces a distorting inﬂuence on judgement and action
(also referred to as ‘implicit bias’).2
Elsewhere, the term ‘implicit bias’ has been used even more expansively. In
addressing the epistemological implications of implicit bias, Tamar Gendler
(2011) discusses the phenomena of racial categorization, stereotype threat, and
the cognitive depletion that subjects experience after interracial interactions, all
under the rubric of ‘implicit bias’. In this context, then, implicit bias is being used
to pick out a range of social cognitions (and affective states), including but not
limited to, unconscious activation and application of stereotypes (involving
conscious feelings of anxiety/threat), automatic categorization (of things or
people into groups which are perceived as sharing properties), and effortful
activity (such as suppression of biased responses or stereotyping).
We contend that whilst in some contexts this kind of expansive understanding
of implicit bias can be useful (Section 2), it also has signiﬁcant limitations and
tends to obscure important differences between implicit associations (Sections
3 and 4).
2 The Usefulness of an Expansive Concept
For three reasons, this broad usage makes considerable sense. First, the processes
at issue in (for example) Gendler’s treatment of the issue are all automatic,
difﬁcult to discern from introspection, difﬁcult to bring under reﬂective control,
and as a result not governed by the same norms of reasoning as are reﬂective
states (such as occurrent beliefs and desires). It is useful to identify a set of
processes that share these features, and contrast them with the kinds of reﬂective
processes to which philosophers have typically attended. This enables attention
to be drawn to the large range of mental activity not encompassed by a focus only
2 Perhaps this conﬂation of output and cognitive content reﬂects the confusion over awareness
mentioned above. While there is no evidence that people lack conscious awareness of the cognitive
content measured by implicit measures, there is evidence to suggest that, under certain conditions,
this content may impact other processes and behaviours outside of conscious awareness (Gawronski
et al., 2006; Hann et al., 2013). As such, the question of whether implicit bias is unconscious depends
on whether one is referring to content or output. More precisely, the evidence seems to suggest that
it is the content that may, under some circumstance, be outside of conscious awareness. One of the
key points we make in this chapter is that distinguishing differing content is important in under-
standing implicit processes—the way content (i.e. mental representations/associations) impacts on
behaviour (output).
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on reﬂective, deliberative cognition, and the importance of recognizing this range
and its role in our mental lives.3
Secondly, functional deﬁnitions such as Saul’s are helpful if one is concerned—
as is important—with articulating the widespread effects of implicit biases, and
the worries that arise in relation to these. For example, if we want to focus on and
articulate the patterns of discrimination in which implicit biases might be
implicated, then attending closely to the nature of the implicit cognitions them-
selves is not the priority task. If the priority is in articulating those effects rather
than looking at the processes that produce those effects and ways of combating
them, then it is reasonable to talk of implicit bias as simply whatever implicit
processes produced those effects. Such a priority is important in gaining recog-
nition of the pervasive nature of the problem. (One cannot encourage people to
adopt strategies to combat the problem if they do not agree that there is a
problem.)
Another consequential reason for subsuming a number of phenomena under
the notion of implicit bias is that it makes it more likely that certain important
claims about implicit bias are true. For example, Saul makes the general claim
that ‘human beings are strongly inﬂuenced by a range of disturbing and often
unconscious biases’ (2013: 40). And indeed, this claim is likely to be true if the
notion of implicit bias is broadly construed to include a range of implicit
social cognitions. The claim that ‘we are all likely to be implicitly biased’ (Saul,
2013: 55) will be true if ‘implicitly biased’ refers to a range of phenomena
extending to a number of different negative and socially consequential implicit
social cognitions.4
We do not mean to suggest that there is any sleight of hand here: gaining
traction in addressing the effects of implicit bias requires garnering agreement on
the claim that almost all of us will need to reconsider the ways in which our
judgements and actions may be inﬂuenced—ways we would ﬁnd surprising and
perhaps uncomfortable. For these purposes, a broad characterization of implicit
bias is legitimate and useful.
3 One might argue that existing notions already perform these useful functions, such as those of
automaticity or system 1 functioning. However, the notions of implicit social cognition, automati-
city, and system 1 processes are all examples of dual-process models of the mind with the
distinctions between these terms simply reﬂecting the particular area of cognitive psychology (i.e.
memory, attention, and decision making, respectively) that gave rise to them. (For an excellent
account of this history, see Gawronski and Payne, 2010.)
4 That is: for a particular bias, b, it may not be probable that an individual has that bias—but for a
range of biases, b1-bn, it is probable that an individual has a bias in that range. So it remains true that
all individuals are likely to have some biases.
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However, we think that there are two dangers in the philosophical dis-
course about implicit bias (which amplify each other). Firstly, we want to
suggest that there are some dangers in regarding ‘implicit bias’ as a catch-all
for a range of implicit (and not so implicit) social cognitions; doing so
permits generalizations that may not be warranted. Secondly, we want to
raise concerns about the tendency to overlook the ways in which processes
that fall under the rubric of implicit bias may differ, either functionally or
structurally, because attending to these differences probably has important
implications for the normative recommendations made about how to combat
problematic implicit biases.
This tendency is reinforced by the philosophical discourse concerning implicit
bias, which speaks to ‘the effects of implicit bias’, ‘the ethical implications of
implicit bias’, ‘the epistemological implications of implicit bias’, and so on. (For
examples of such usage, see Gendler, 2011; Saul, 2013; Machery et al., 2010;
Holroyd, 2012). This kind of discourse implies that the concern is with a certain
homogeneous phenomenon (implicit bias) and its effects, and plays down the
idea that there might be differences within the phenomena falling under the
rubric of implicit bias.
It is our contention that, for some purposes, these differences matter. Perhaps
most importantly, the differences matter to the kinds of normative recommenda-
tions needed concerning how to mitigate or remove the inﬂuence of implicit
biases.
3 Implicit Processes and Different Kinds
of Implicit Association
Philosophers are not alone in making assumptions about the uniﬁed nature of the
phenomena. Amodio (2008) observes that ‘researchers [including empirical
psychologists] have generally assumed that implicit stereotyping and evaluation
arise from the same underlying mechanism’ (7). In the following sections we
articulate the reasons to suppose that implicit bias is functionally heterogeneous,
and that this heterogeneity matters considerably. We also consider the reasons
for holding that the processes underpinning implicit biases are heterogeneous,
but raise concerns about one dimension along which these processes have been
distinguished.
In the literature from empirical psychology, we ﬁnd reference to ‘implicit
processes’ rather than implicit biases (Amodio and Mendoza, 2010; Nosek,
Hawkins, and Frazier, 2012; for a review, see Gawronski and Payne, 2010).
This suggests that what is at issue is a set of processes which share the property
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of being ‘implicit’—generally (and not uncontestedly5) under the radar of reﬂect-
ive introspection, difﬁcult to bring under reﬂective control, and quick and
efﬁcient.
Amodio (in accordance with most other psychologists working in this domain,
e.g. Fazio, 2007; Greenwald et al., 2002) understands these implicit processes
essentially to consist in the utilization of ‘associations stored in memory’ (2010:
364). Associations6 are discerned by tests such as the implicit association test
(IAT) and affective priming task (Fazio et al., 1995). In the IAT (the most popular
implicit measure) the implicit associations present in an individual’s cognitive
structures are revealed in the swiftness of response in categorizing concepts into
pairs. A range of experimental tests aims to reveal individuals’ associations, and
thereby identify factors that may play a role in perception, judgement, and action,
but which go unreported in reﬂective (explicit) statements of what guided
behaviour (either because of self-presentation worries; Fazio and Olson, 2003)
or simply because such associations are not readily detectable by the agent (see
Brownstein and Saul, this volume, for a description of implicit measures such as
the IAT).
What kinds of associations are at issue here? A number of central cases of
implicit bias have concerned philosophers (there are numerous studies, but these
have received signiﬁcant attention). The associations between social category and
stereotypic or negative notions are cause for particular concern. Such associations
have variously been found to guide the evaluation of CVs, produce shooter bias,
and affect interracial interactions (see e.g. Saul, 2013; Kelly and Roedder, 2008;
Machery et al., 2010). Are the same associative mechanisms, or kinds of mech-
anism, involved in each of these cases? Do the associations all function in the
same way, or are there important differences?
We advance two claims here: ﬁrst, that evidence indicates that different
associations have different characteristics. Accordingly, there is reason to doubt
that all generalizations about implicit bias can be substantiated, and to be
5 See e.g. Monteith, Voils, and Ashburn-Nardo (2001); De Houwer (2006); Fazio and Olson
(2003); Nosek et al. (2012).
6 The idea that memory, and the mind more broadly, is associative is a long-held view in
philosophy. Subsequently, psychologists and neuroscientists concerned with learning and memory
have adopted this idea. However, there is work to suggest that this associative picture of mind may
be fundamentally ﬂawed (see Gallistel, 2008; Gallistel and King, 2009; Gallistel and Matzel, 2013).
While discussion of this point is outside the scope of the present chapter, we feel it important to
acknowledge and to make clear that our argument is not fundamentally based on an associative
picture of the mind. Regardless of the way memory is organized and instantiated in the brain, we
believe that it is a mistake to suppose that the cognitive processes at work in implicit biases are all
relevantly similar.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF  FIRST PROOF, 18/11/2015, SPi
THE HETEROGENEITY OF IMPLICIT BIAS 
Comp. by: Bendict Richard Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002632317 Date:18/11/15
Time:09:19:24 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002632317.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 86
cautious about talk of ‘implicit bias’ simpliciter. Secondly, drawing on the work of
Amodio (2008) and Amodio and Devine (2006), we consider whether it is
appropriate to understand that one dimension along which implicit bias differs,
both in terms of content and underpinning structure, is in terms of whether
implicit associations are semantic or affective. These terms refer to ways of
categorizing kinds of associative process: ﬁrstly, according to whether the content
of the association concerns the meaning of the associated constructs, or the
positive or negative affect accompanying a construct; and secondly, in terms of
the processes underpinning these different contents. We argue that this distinc-
tion is problematically deployed in their empirical studies, and so whilst we might
endorse the general claim that implicit associations differ functionally, in respect
of how they seem to operate in relation to other beliefs and behaviours, we do not
endorse the more speciﬁc claim that these differences are captured or predicted
by either contents, or an underlying structure, that is understood in terms of the
semantic/affective distinction. However, if the claim about functional difference
is right, there will be important consequences for making generalizations about
implicit bias. In particular, there are implications for the general recommenda-
tions made concerning how to mitigate implicit bias, which we address in the
Section 4.
3.1 Biases behaving differently: two kinds of heterogeneity
At ﬁrst glance, it seems clear that the studies that have been focused upon involve
different associations. Some studies test for gendered associations, others test for
associations with racial categories, others still for age, sexuality, and religious or
ethnic groups, and respective associations.7 Clearly, there are different associ-
ations involved in the studies reported on. The strength of implicit associations
between the following categories (inter alia) have been tested:
• Gender (gendered words: she, woman/he, man) and words associated with
leadership (manager, director/worker, assistant) (Webb, Sheeran, and
Pepper, 2010).
• Sexuality (images of gay and heterosexual kisses) and positive and negative
words (Payne, Cooley, Loersch, and Lei, ms.).
7 Other implicit associations that have little directly to do with social identity have also been
studied, such as associations concerned with health and other foods, with objects of fear (such as
snakes), and so on. Whilst these associations have garnered less interest from philosophers, they
have been important in advancing understanding of the kind of cognitive processes at work in these
implicit attitudes and in developing clinical interventions for addiction and various
psychopathologies.
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• Race (black and white name primes) and personal preferences (like/dislike)
(Olson and Fazio, 2004); black and white faces and positive and negative
words (Amodio and Devine, 2006).
• Gendered pronouns (he/she) and job titles (nurse, mechanic) (Banaji and
Hardin, 1996).
• Ethnic/religious group words (Muslim/Scottish) and words associated with
terror, or peace (Webb, Sheeran, and Pepper, 2010).
It is obvious that there are different associations involved here; the relevant
associations hold between relata with different content. But even this obvious
fact is obscured by talk of ‘implicit bias’ simpliciter, without note of which
associations are in play. Attending to this prompts us to ask what these differ-
ences in content amount to; should we expect all of these associations to behave
in similar ways? We claim that there is reason to suppose not, and that this has
implications for philosophical discussion about, and practical recommendations
relating to, implicit biases. One explanation for the functional differences we
outline in Section 3.2 appeals to the difference in contents. This means that it
would be of utmost importance to attend to the content of implicit biases, rather
than talk about implicit bias in generalized terms, if one is concerned to outline
the effects, and ways of combating discriminatory behaviours.
A second kind of explanation might appeal to different processes involved in
implicit cognition. For example, some have argued that there is reason to suppose
that the various implicit measures are accessing discreet and non-uniﬁed implicit
associations (such that they do not all cluster together to form an ‘implicit
attitude’), or perhaps different kinds of implicit processes. The IAT is one
amongst a number of implicit measures; that is, tests which attempt to ‘get at’
individuals’ implicit associations (such as their implicit race associations).
A number of authors have pointed out that individuals’ scores across implicit
measures weakly correlate (that is, showing an implicit association on one
measure does not correlate with showing an implicit association on another
measure). For example, Fazio and Olson (2003) cite various studies in which
they observe the ‘disappointing correlations among various implicit measures’,
and report that ‘in our own lab we have repeatedly failed to observe correlations
between IAT measures and priming measures of racial attitudes’ (277).
In a survey article, Nosek et al. (2007) argue that one of the best explanations
for this weak correlation is simply the range of processes being tested for by the
various implicit measures:
[t]he relations may also reﬂect heterogeneity of cognitive processes that contribute to the
various measures. The term implicit has become widely applied to measurement methods
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for which subjects may be unaware of what is being measured, unaware of how it is being
measured, or unable to control their performance on the measure. Identiﬁcation of the
cognitive processes that contribute to different measures will promote a more nuanced
description and categorization of methods based on the particular processes that they
engage. (277)
The idea for our present purposes is that the lack of correlation between implicit
measures, as Nosek claims, is explained by the different processes or cognitive
structures that each measure is tapping into. Nosek et al. suggest:
The next generation of research in implicit cognition will likely revise the simple implicit–
explicit distinction and introduce a more reﬁned taxonomy that better reﬂects the
heterogeneity of cognitive processes that are collectively termed implicit. (267)
Accordingly, there are two ways in which implicit biases might be heterogeneous.
Firstly, we may observe functional heterogeneity in the way that different implicit
associations operate (perhaps explainable by differences in content); and sec-
ondly, there may be heterogeneity in the processes underpinning different
implicit associations. In this chapter we remain agnostic as to whether the
heterogeneity manifest in implicit associations is attributable to different content
or to different underlying processes. (Whilst the content explanation could do the
explanatory work, it is possible that better formulated understandings of the
structural differences might also have explanatory power.) Our main contention
is that philosophers also need to be alert to the dimensions of heterogeneity in the
ways that implicit biases operate, and possible distinctions between different
kinds of implicit cognitive processes, that might explain this, for two reasons.
Firstly, because evidence supporting such a taxonomy is relevant to precisely
what generalizations can be made about implicit associations. Secondly, because
the way that the distinctions are drawn may themselves require philosophical
scrutiny. We return to this point in Section 3.2.
Regarding the ﬁrst concern, about the generalizations that are warranted, one
illustration of this pertains to the claims that philosophers have variously made
about individuals being afﬂicted by implicit bias irrespective of their explicit
beliefs. But there is reason to suppose that this generalization cannot be made.
With respect to some associations, this claim seems true: in tests for implicit
associations between gendered pronouns (he/she) and stereotypical roles (nurse/
secretary), Banaji and Hardin (1996) found no difference in the extent of implicit
biases between individuals who, on self-report measures, scored either high or
low in sexist beliefs (139). In contrast, in studies reported in Devine (2002), it
appears that individuals who held non-prejudiced behaviour to be important in
itself display less race bias on race IATs (which require pairing black and white
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face or names with positive or negative words); that is, the explicit beliefs and
attitudes an individual held did seem to correlate with the degree of implicit bias
they manifested. (See also Nosek et al., 2007 (277–8) for discussion of the cases in
which self-report measures seem to correlate with implicit attitudes.)
Crucially, the heterogeneity of implicit biases in this respect means that some
generalizations about the relationship of implicit associations to explicit beliefs—
such as that implicit biases are independent of explicit attitudes—cannot be
substantiated.
We have in this section distinguished between two ways in which implicit
biases might be heterogeneous: functionally, or in terms of the underlying
processes. We provided some evidence that supports functional heterogeneity,
and indicated the reasons for which some have suggested that there may be
heterogeneity in terms of the underlying processes involved. Of course, one
explanation for these bits of evidence could be simply that the experimental
designs did not always produce or measure the effects that they should or could
have (cf. Nosek et al., 2007: 276). Nonetheless, the ﬁndings should give reason to
exercise caution about claims that are general in nature, and that make recom-
mendations for the regulation of bias that suppose general applicability of such
recommendations. In Sections 3.2.a–3.2.c we provide further considerations in
support of the claim that the best explanation of this heterogeneity is not
experimental deﬁcit, but rather differences between implicit associations and
their operation.
3.2 Distinct associations with distinct behavioural in  uence
We have identiﬁed associations that are obviously, on the face of it, different. We
have noted that some of these biases appear to stand in different relationships to
explicit beliefs. This sufﬁces for our central message of caution regarding the
generalizations that can be made about implicit biases (a message we shall
elaborate in Section 4). At least in this respect, then, generalizations about
implicit biases are mistaken. This is signiﬁcant, as there is a tendency to suppose
that implicit biases are unrelated to explicit beliefs, and this may have further
implications for how questions such as control, responsibility, and accountability
are considered.
In this section we consider a further way in which implicit associations may
differ; namely, with respect to the inﬂuence they exert on different kinds of
behaviour. This dimension of functional heterogeneity has been articulated in
the context of empirical studies that aim to differentiate between different
underlying processes: ‘semantic’ and ‘affective’ associations. If we take these
experimental results at face value, then there would be reason to suppose that it
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identiﬁes some underlying structure to the heterogeneous implicit processes.
However, we argue that there are reasons to worry about this distinction, and
that it should not, as presently articulated, be endorsed. This does not, however,
undermine our central claim that implicit biases differ in important ways; there
seems to be some important functional heterogeneity, though it is not best
captured in terms of semantic and affective associations. Moreover, our discus-
sion reinforces the claim that philosophers should attend to the ways in which
psychologists are distinguishing different implicit biases. We explore the impli-
cations of this claim in the ﬁnal section.
We start by presenting the further dimension of functional heterogeneity, then
explain—and critique—the conceptual framework used to articulate this in terms
of the heterogeneous underlying structures, by empirical psychologists.
 .  .  DISTINCT ASSOCIATIONS
Amodio and Devine (2006) attempted to isolate the operation of different
associations, and test for the presence of each. In order to do this, they con-
structed two race IATs. One was designed to test for associations between race
and certain stereotypic traits: white/black, and mental (e.g. brainy, smart, edu-
cated) or physical (athletic, agile, rhythmic) constructs. They supposed that
individuals might hold these implicit associations (such as a stronger association
between black and physical constructs and between white and mental constructs)
without also having negative attitudes or affect associated with that racial cat-
egory (in common and imprecise parlance, an individual might hold a stereotype
without having negative attitudes or disliking the stereotyped individuals). The
second IAT was designed to test for these latter, negative affect-laden associations
by asking participants to pair black or white faces with pleasant or unpleasant
constructs (respectively: love, loyal, freedom; abuse, bomb, sickness).8
The striking—and crucial for our purposes—ﬁnding was this: ‘the participant’s
scores on the two IAT’s were uncorrelated’ (Amodio and Devine, 2006: 14). That
is to say, the extent to which individuals expressed the mental/physical associ-
ations was not correlated with scores on the second IAT for negative implicit
attitudes.
Why is this signiﬁcant? Firstly, it suggests that the two associations were in
some subjects operating independently (Amodio and Devine, 2006: 655). Whilst
we might expect many implicit associations to go in step (for example, we might
expect an individual who implicitly associates black men with danger to also have
8 This kind of attitude (stereotyping without negative affect) is termed ‘benign racism’ in analyses
of racism. See e.g. Garcia (1996).
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implicit negative affect—fear—towards them), this study indicates that at least
some implicit associations about the same group are held independently. (Note
that this observation is more readily made once we attend carefully to the
different contents of implicit associations, obscured by generalized speak of
‘implicit bias’.)
Secondly, these ﬁndings indicate that there may be variation across individuals
with respect to which associations are operative in producing implicitly biased
perceptions, judgements of or actions towards a particular group. For any
implicit association, some individuals may have it and others may not (which
is consistent with the variation in affective association found in studies by Devine
et al., 2002). But the presence of (e.g.) one kind of implicit race association does
not entail the presence of other forms of implicit race associations9—and con-
versely, the absence of one implicit association does not entail that one is free
from other problematic implicit race biases.
Even if much of the time, or in many subjects, implicit associations work in
concert, if there are distinct associations then it will be important to understand
further the ways in which they may differ. This is of crucial import, given the
differential behavioural outputs that these two implicit associations correlated
with, which we now describe.
 .  .  DISTINCT INFLUENCES ON BEHAVIOUR
Not only did the studies indicate that different implicit associations were not
correlated; they also indicated that the different associations uniquely predict
different behavioural outcomes. In the study by Amodio and Devine (2006),
participants were asked to make judgements about the competences of a potential
test partner, and then asked to sit and wait for their test partner to enter the
room. The—in fact, ﬁctive—test partner was indicated to be African American.
Seating distance was measured as a behavioural indicator of positive or negative
affect. Experimental participants who displayed strong associations on the race
IAT for the mental/physical constructs, described in Section 3.2.a, made judge-
ments about the competence of their test partner consistent with stereotypes
(such as competence on questions about sports and popular culture, rather than
mathematics). But these kinds of association did not predict greater seating
distance from the test partner. On the other hand, manifestation of strong
negative evaluative associations on the affect-based IAT uniquely predicted
9 As Alex Madva has pointed out (correspondence), it might permit us to infer the increased
probability of other sorts of implicit race association, even if the correlation is low.
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seating distance (greater negative associations correlated with greater seating
distance), but not judgements of competence.10
So, one association seems to be implicated in the judgements and evaluations
individuals made, the other in approach or avoidance behaviours. This provides
further support for the worry we raise: that certain generalizations about pre-
dicted behaviours cannot be made across various implicit associations. Note that
this is not at all surprising when we consider associations that differ in their
target: we would not expect gender associations to predict behavioural outcomes
regarding racial interactions. What is noteworthy here is that different race
associations (that is, associations that concern the same target social identity)
are operating independently and with different behavioural predictions.11
If different implicit associations seem to exert inﬂuence on different kinds of
behaviour, then understanding this will be important in formulating strategies
that aim to combat implicit bias. In relation to the particular associations at issue
here, for example, if one is involved in a task such as evaluation of an individual’s
competence or intelligence, then mitigating the associations between race and
mental or physical constructs that may inﬂuence that judgement will be of
particular importance. On the other hand, if one is concerned with increasing
the amount and quality of intergroup contact, one might focus on limiting or
changing negative affective associations. We return to this point in Section 4.1.
 .  .  A DIMENSION OF HETEROGENEITY: SEMANTIC
AND AFFECTIVE ASSOCIATIONS?
The experimental results we have just presented support our thesis that implicit
associations are functionally heterogeneous and may not readily admit of the
sorts of generalization that have been made (concerning behavioural predictions
and their relation to explicit beliefs, for example). However, these results are
framed in empirical psychology in terms of two different kinds of association:
semantic and affective. The idea is that this identiﬁes a systematic difference in
content, which is underpinned by a structural heterogeneity (along which the
10 It is worth noting the study by Macrae et al. (1994), which seems to indicate that stereotypes
can affect seating distance. Participants in whom stereotypes were activated sat further from the
stigmatized individual. Is this ﬁnding in tension with that by Amodio and Devine (2006)? We think
not. It is important to observe that the stereotype at work in the study by Macrae et al. was that of
‘skinhead’, which is likely to involve various associations (fear, hostility, aggression) that are more
similar to the negative evaluative associations found to predict greater seating distance in the study
by Amodio and Devine. Moreover, this ﬁnding drives home our overall point that it is difﬁcult to
make generalizations across different kinds of association. Attention must be paid to how different
contents may produce different behavioural predictions and outcomes.
11 Thanks to Alex Madva for emphasizing the importance of this point.
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functional heterogeneity may be explained). The mental/physical constructs are
identiﬁed as ‘semantic’ associations. Other examples of this kind of association
are salt/pepper and woman/she. The unpleasant/pleasant constructs (used on the
second IAT described in Section 3.2.a) are identiﬁed as ‘affective’ associations—
those that have an affective valence. Other associations put into this category
include those for which one relata is evaluative, either generally (‘good/bad’) or in
more speciﬁc ways (‘attractive/disgusting’). Generalizations about these two
kinds of association, concerning their inﬂuence on behaviour, how they might
be learned or unlearned, are then made. Here we have not adopted this way of
conceptualizing the distinction, nor supposed that the differences described in
the previous sections are underpinned by such a distinction—either in content, or
in underpinning processing—and are reluctant to do so for the following reasons.
Firstly, even if we endorse heterogeneity in content, considerations of parsi-
mony counsel against explaining these differences in terms of different under-
lying associative processes. That implicit associations dissociate, and generate
different behavioural predictions, could be explained in terms of the content of
the associations, without recourse to distinct underlying mechanisms.
Secondly, however, even at the level of contents, the distinction posited is itself
problematic. Whilst it is coherent to draw such a distinction (between those
associations which have affective content and those which do not), the way this
distinction is deployed is problematic. For one thing, it seems inappropriate to
characterize one side of the distinction as ‘semantic’. How should we best make
sense of the idea of a ‘semantic’ association? This category has been used to
identify associations that hold between ‘semantically related concepts’ (Amodio,
2008: 8). But that idea seems deployed problematically in the study described in
Sections 3.2.a and 3.2.b: the stereotypic association is not adequately character-
ized as a matter of the semantic meaning of black or white; nothing in the
meaning of these terms is associated with mental or physical constructs (in
contrast, the meaning of woman/she clearly is semantically related; a paradigm
case of semantic relationship is between ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’). The
characterization might aim to pick out the fact that certain semantic content has
become associated with the racial category, such that the two are associated in
mind. But this does not help us to pick out one side of the distinction, as
paradigm relata of affective associations ( good, attractive, and so on) have
semantic content which comes to be associated with one social group.
Perhaps what is at issue is the contents of a schema (or stereotype) for different
racial categories (and other aspects of social identity) (Haslanger, 2008). Schemas
are characterized by Haslanger as ‘a patterned set of dispositions in response to
one’s circumstances’ (212). Might we understand semantic associations in terms
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of the contents of a schema, saying that if included in a schema, an association (a
kind of pattern of thought) is semantically associated? The problem is that it is
not at all clear that schemas do not include the sorts of association that have been
classiﬁed as ‘affective’, as dispositions to respond could just as well be under-
pinned by affect as by cognitive understandings. (Haslanger is here drawing on
Valian (2005), who denies that schemas have affective content. Valian writes that
on her account, schemas are ‘cold’. Her account ‘is purely cognitive rather than
emotional or motivational’ (198). We believe our point to show that Valian’s
understanding of schemas, which is narrower than Haslanger’s, to be mistaken in
excluding affective content, if that is to include the negative affect that attaches to
evaluative terms such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘loyal’, ‘evil’, and so on.)
All this raises worries for characterizing one side of the distinction as ‘seman-
tic’. But the difﬁculty is not simply that this way of describing the distinction
seems inapt; rather, the distinction does not seem to cut where it needs to in order
for Amodio and Devine to draw their conclusions about the heterogeneity of
content, or underlying processes (as affective or semantic). If the distinction is
supposed to be between associations with semantic content and those without,
then this distinction was not adequately captured by their experimental design,
because some associations that are supposed to be on the affective side have
semantic content (good, disgusting, and so on).
Perhaps the distinction captured by their experimental design is supposed to
be between associations that are affectively valenced (with positive or negative
affective ‘pull’) and those that are not. Some who endorse the primacy-of-affect
thesis, according to which all concepts held have some valence, might worry
about this characterization: everything, it seems, would fall into the ‘affective’
category. One might reject that worry: perhaps the ‘affective’ associations can be
identiﬁed as those that produce affect above a certain threshold. Even still, whilst
this may present us with a conceptually coherent way of drawing the distinction
that the categories do not seem to be exclusive seems to pose difﬁculties for the
thesis that there are two distinct kinds of content, which operate on two different
underlying structures, about which generalizations and predictions can be made.
This is especially so because the experimental studies utilize notions which
incorporate both semantic content and affect (good/bad, attractive/disgusting,
and so on).
Even those terms that are supposed to indicate semantic associations in
Amodio and Devine’s studies (intelligence, athleticism, smart) have both evalu-
ative and semantic content (the characteristics are positive, good, features). So,
we might at this stage claim that such a distinction is coherent (if not best
described as ‘semantic’ and ‘affective’), but that the studies by Amodio and
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Devine do not exclusively track this distinction, insofar as the supposedly seman-
tic associations had affective content, and the supposedly affective associations
had semantic content. Given this, their deployment of the distinction cannot be
used to support the claim that there are two kinds of association that generate
distinct behavioural predictions.
An analogy can help us to make this point. Suppose one wanted to evaluate
children’s well-being, and one supposed that a dimension that might explain
different levels of well-being is whether a child has an active father in their life, or
is raised by a single parent. One might construct a study to evaluate this
hypothesis. But that distinction on which the hypothesis rests is deployed
problematically, and cannot be explanatorily useful in predicting different out-
comes, because (obviously) some single parents are fathers. In order to test the
hypothesis, the study would have to compare the outcomes of those children who
did not have an active father, and those who did. If there are different outcomes
in children’s well-being, some other way of understanding and describing the
circumstances that might make that difference must be sought. By the same
token, the distinction between semantic and affective distinctions cannot be
posited as explanatorily useful in explaining different outcomes (e.g. different
behavioural inﬂuences) if some so-called semantic associations investigated are
also strongly affect-laden. In order to test the hypothesis, the study would have to
compare associations which are not affect-laden with those which are. Until the
distinction is deployed in a way that really does investigate distinct instances of
each sort of implicit association, the ﬁndings can support the claim that the
heterogeneity consists in two independent and distinct processes: affective and
semantic.
Given these concerns, we do not here endorse the idea that what distinguishes
different implicit associations (and any different underlying mechanisms) is that
some are semantic and others affective. We should not endorse this as accurately
capturing heterogeneous underlying processes involved in implicit biases. This is
consequential for the notions that are at work in empirical psychology: we
suggest that this distinction has been unsatisfactorily deployed. If Nosek is
right that more ﬁne-grained understandings of the cognitive processes involved
in implicit cognition are needed, then so is more attention to the way that these
processes are conceptualized and deployed in empirical studies.
Is it worth attempting to construct further studies which investigate this
distinction? We have indications that different implicit associations generate
different behavioural predictions. Whether this is a function of the affective
content of the association, or indeed a distinct process particular to affective-
laden associations, remains an open question—one worth pursuing insofar as it is
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worth ﬁnding out what sorts of generalization can be made, and on what basis
(the content of associations, or processes underlying them). It is not impossible to
imagine how that distinction could be adequately operationalized. For instance,
one might imagine an experimental paradigm in which the positive and negative
words are replaced with (neuro)physiologically induced feelings of pleasure vs.
displeasure on which to make more ‘purely’ affective categorizations. These could
be contrasted with associations without affect (or with only a very low affective
content). Such an undertaking is fraught with practical difﬁculties, but is not, in
principle, impossible to implement. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to
develop any full proposals for such efforts, but we would encourage psychologists
and others to consider the possible ways of proceeding. Perhaps only if systematic
content differences were then discerned might it be appropriate to consider
claims about the underlying processes for the distinct content differences.
For present purposes, we need not establish that there are differences in terms
of distinct and heterogeneous implicit processes. Rather, our aim is to draw
attention to the fact that there are important functional differences with respect
to some implicit associations—some of which are in terms of the degree of affect,
which seems to make a difference (perhaps it is not the only thing that makes a
difference) to the behavioural predictions generated. At present, experimental
evidence supports the claim that implicit associations differ in some respects,
such that some generalizations about implicit bias are unsupported. But, we have
argued, it is not warranted to identify the respects in which they differ to be with
regard to the associations being carved into two kinds: semantic or affective.
There remain two possibilities. One is to hold that implicit biases operate on
fundamentally the same sort of process, but that they are dissociable and can
functionally differ signiﬁcantly in various dimensions (with respect to degree of
awareness, relationship to explicit belief, behavioural predictions). Another is to
hold that there are multiple processes involved in the category of implicit biases,
and that these different processes correspond to the different features we have
highlighted. At this stage, we do not believe that the considerations we have
marshalled speak in favour of one or other of these theses—but there is much
further work to be done on this topic.
3.3 Summary
We began by showing that experimental results illustrate functional differences
which mean that it will be difﬁcult to make certain generalizations about the
phenomena that fall under the rubric of ‘implicit bias’. These functional differ-
ences may be explicable in terms of content, or in terms of heterogeneity of
underlying structure, such as whether the associations are affect-laden or not.
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However, the way experimental studies have deployed the distinction between
different kinds of association mean that those conclusions cannot provide sup-
port for there being two distinct kinds of process. It remains an open question
what best explains the functional differences observed. That there are functional
differences, however, is not in doubt. This claim is supported by the following
considerations: the differences in content and the failure of correlation across
implicit measures; the different relationship of implicit associations to explicit
beliefs; and the different behavioural predictions generated by different implicit
associations. To the extent that there is reason to believe that these functional
differences are explained by heterogeneous cognitive processes, however, we
suggest that further work is to be done in making precise the nature of this
heterogeneity and deploying it in experimental design.
We have already alluded to the fact that these ﬁndings will have implications
for philosophical discourse about implicit bias. In Section 4 we explain in more
detail what we take these implications to be, and make speciﬁc recommendations
about how philosophical discussions about implicit bias can accommodate these
concerns.
4 Implications of the Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias
In this section we draw out the key implications of recognizing the functional
heterogeneity of implicit bias.
4.1 Avoiding misleading generalizations, speci c normative recommendations
The ﬁrst implication of the aforementioned discussion pertains to the kinds of
theoretical claims that have been made about implicit bias. Philosophers have
reported on implicit bias in rather general terms, frequently talking of ‘implicit
bias’ simpliciter or ‘implicit race bias’, rather than noting the particular kinds of
association at issue. For clarity’s sake, it would be useful to articulate the speciﬁc
associations at issue. What particular stereotypical constructs are they associated
with? Are evaluative associations at issue? What degree of negative affect is
involved? One reason for which it is important to do so is that there are
implications for the kinds of normative recommendations philosophers make
about strategies for combating implicit bias.
Such strategies generally fall into two categories (see Jolls and Sunstein, 2006).
Insulating strategies aim to put in place mechanisms that prevent bias from being
activated by insulating individuals from the information that might activate
them. For example, anonymizing CVs or essays means that evaluators do not
have the information (about the gender, age, or race, and so on, of the evaluated
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individual) that might trigger implicit associations that distort judgement or
inﬂuence behaviour. This sort of strategy, therefore, need not be sensitive to
the functional heterogeneity of implicit bias, insofar as it simply prevents bias
triggering information from reaching the individual.
Mitigating strategies are those that attempt to limit any effects of implicit bias
where activation and inﬂuence remains a possibility (because insulation from
bias relevant information is not possible). Mitigation might occur either by
hindering the activation of the bias, or if it is activated, by blocking its inﬂuence
upon judgement or action. For example, in interview contexts, where at least
some salient social identities of an individual are not possible to ‘cover up’ or
‘anonymize’, steps need to be taken to reduce the likelihood of any implicit
associations being activated, or if activated, from having an effect on judgement
or action. Such steps might involve the deliberate exposure to counterstereoty-
pical exemplars (so as to inhibit the activation of stereotypical associations) (Joy-
Gaba and Nosek, 2010), or having agreed upon the weightings of criteria for
evaluation (so that the inﬂuence of bias—which can lead merit to be redeﬁned to
accommodate bias—might be corrected) (Uhlmann and Cohen, 2005), or even
pre-interview ‘retraining’ of behavioural disposition, so that avoidance disposi-
tions are replaced with approach responses (Kawakami et al., 2007).
We argue that recommendations about the kind of mitigating strategies that
should be undertaken need to be sensitive to the content of implicit associations
likely to be at work, and the kind of behavioural outcome at issue. For example,
the limited experimental ﬁndings outlined in Section 3.2 suggest that some
implicit associations will inﬂuence judgement rather than approach/avoidance
behaviours, and others will have greater inﬂuence on such behaviours (but less so
on evaluative judgements). If this is right, then it is possible that a mitigating
strategy might misﬁre by targeting an implicit association that is less likely to
be inﬂuential in that particular context. For example, in light of the ﬁndings
described in Section 3.2, we might say that if one is aiming to mitigate the
inﬂuence of implicit associations on interracial interactions (which may involve
approach/avoidance behaviours, such as seating distance) it would be a mistake
to focus mitigating strategies on the implicit associations between mental/
physical constructs and race (for example, by utilizing counterstereotypical
exemplars to that stereotype). The strength of those associations did not correlate
with greater seating distance (avoidance behaviour). Conversely, strategies which
require individuals to reprogramme certain approach or avoidance responses to
overcome implicit race biases might target negative affect (as has been shown in
Kawakami et al., 2007) and make for smoother interracial interactions, but it
is not clear that they will be effective in mitigating the inﬂuence of implicit
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associations that feed into evaluations of competence or academic aptitude. For
example, the IATs that measured the effects of approach/avoidance response
reprogramming, in Kawakami et al. (2007), tested for impact on associations with
generally positive (love, cheer, happy) and negative (pain, hate, evil) constructs,
rather than for speciﬁc stereotypical associations such as those in Amodio and
Devine (2006). Indeed, there is reason to suppose that certain strategies that may
challenge negative affect would not be at all effective in mitigating stereotypical
associations: the use of positive exemplars to challenge negative affect might
nonetheless encode associations that afﬁrm some other stereotypes. (For
example, using Wilt Chamberlain or Michael Jordan as a positive exemplar
might entrench the stereotypical associations concerning between black and
physical, rather than mental, constructs).
Given the need for more information about the ways in which different
implicit associations might operate differently, we are hesitant to make concrete
proposals about how best to mitigate biases. Indeed, as more research reveals
the different cognitive processes that may explain such functional differences,
more research will be needed on what strategies are relevant to different
implicit associations. However, our key claim is that it is important to be
alert to the possibility that different associations are in play, and that adopting
one strategy for mitigating implicit bias (e.g. exposure to counterstereotypical
exemplars) is likely to be at best partial, and may address only part of the
possible associations that could lead to implicitly biased outcomes. An aware-
ness of how different strategies are effective in combating different implicit
associations should counsel in favour of more comprehensive strategies for
mitigating implicit biases.
Moreover, there are implications for individuals reﬂecting on whether they
need to undertake such strategies. Precisely because implicit associations have
been found to operate independently of each other, simply because an individ-
ual has been found not to have one implicit association (e.g. one IAT result that
does not show an implicit race bias) does not mean that they do not have
another quite similar one. As Alex Madva aptly expresses it (in correspond-
ence): ‘Maybe a given doctor has good interpersonal interactions with black
people but still doesn’t give them appropriate drug prescriptions. Just because
you lack one racial bias doesn’t mean you’re off the hook.’ Likewise, undertak-
ing one bias-mitigating strategy does not mean that others will not remain
operative. Recognizing the complexity of implicit associations, how they are
related, and their functional heterogeneity, has important implications for
evaluating one’s own susceptibility to, and strategies for mitigating, the inﬂu-
ence of bias.
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4.2 Four recommendations
Research programmes into the way in which the different kinds of association
differ and interact are ongoing. On the basis of the argumentation in this
chapter, we ﬁrst make the recommendation to empirical psychologists that the
distinction between affective and semantic associations be revisited, and how it
is experimentally deployed reconsidered. Moreover, because of the functional
heterogeneity of implicit biases, and because of the difﬁculty of understanding
how they might work together when multiple biases are all in play, it is
important that the effects of implicit bias and interventions to tackle it be
based on evidence beyond that garnered from psychology laboratories. We
need to base recommendations for real-world interventions on rigorous ﬁeld-
experimental work.
We have three more recommendations for philosophers continuing to work
on the range of important issues raised by the empirical ﬁndings about implicit
bias. First, we recommend caution with respect to generalizations that are made
about implicit bias. Whilst some generalizations are true and useful, we have
drawn on evidence that indicates that other such generalizations are at best
misleading.
Second, with respect to the formulation and implementation of normative
claims concerning how to mitigate the effects of implicit biases, we recommend
approaches that acknowledge the functional differences between implicit biases,
and different strategies that might be needed to combat each of them. Attention
to the different associations that might be involved in a given context, and the
speciﬁc strategies that might be needed to combat the different kinds of implicit
association, is needed. (We might aver that employing as many strategies as
possible is the best plan, but, whilst a reasonable inference, this is as yet empir-
ically unsupported.)
Finally, when writing about implicit bias, whilst the shorthand and general
term ‘implicit bias’ can be useful, it would often be of helpful (both for assessing
the truth of the claims made, and the likely efﬁcacy of normative recommenda-
tions drawn from the claims) if the particular kinds of association at issue are
articulated. This will assist in the identiﬁcation of the association at issue, the
contexts in which that particular association is likely to be particularly problem-
atic, and the kinds of mitigating strategy that are likely to be efﬁcacious. Recog-
nizing and accommodating the heterogeneity of implicit bias may be an
important step in effectively combating its effects.
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